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INCENTIVES MUST CHANGE: ADDRESSING 







 Current law encourages patentees and defendants in a patent 
infringement suit to make the most widely varying arguments for 
reasonable royalty damages.  The parties have so much discretion in 
presenting calculations for reasonable royalty damages that it is not 
uncommon for the patentee to request damages 80-100 times greater 
than the infringer’s proposed damages.  Permitting so much 
discretion makes it highly unlikely that the resulting damages will be 
reasonable, and thus fails to achieve the goal of determining a 
reasonable royalty.   
The problem is simple.  Patents are difficult to value.  When a third 
party decision-maker, such as a jury, cannot accurately assess value, 
the decision-maker often splits the difference as a compromise.  If a 
litigating party knows that the decision-maker is simply going to split 
the difference, then that party has the incentive to argue for damages 
 *  An abbreviated version of this paper recently won a prize in the 2013 
Pennsylvania Bar Association Intellectual Property Law Section Writing Competition 
(2nd Place) and will be published in an upcoming newsletter.  See Dan McManus, 
Incentives Must Change: Addressing the Unpredictability of Reasonable Royalty 
Damages, P.B.A. Intellectual Property Law Newsletter, Fall 2013.  Currently available 
at https://www.pabar.org/public/ sections/iplaw/ipwritingcomp.asp. 
 **  Dan McManus: Villanova University School of Law, J.D. (2013); University of 
Delaware, B.S. Chem. E. (2003); Registered Patent Agent.  Thanks to Lindsay 
Grubish and my parents for their ongoing support and encouragement in 
completing this article and to Michael Risch for his helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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2 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
as far away from their opposing party as possible.  This tactic allows 
the party to skew the midpoint of the resulting split to their side as 
much as possible.  This misaligned incentive is the root cause of the 
unpredictability in reasonable royalty damages and other proposals 
have failed to address it.   
The solution is also simple.  The incentive for parties to make the 
most widely varying damages arguments possible must be replaced 
with an incentive to make the most reasonable argument for 
damages.  This could be accomplished by requiring the jury to 
choose the more reasonable of the proposed royalty rates as the basis 
for determining the reasonable royalty.  Using this solution along 
with some other proposals in the Article, I illustrate how the range of 
damages argued by the parties in a recent case could have been 
dramatically reduced from a factor of 100 to a factor of 2.5.  When a 
jury must decide between proposals that are only off by a factor of 2.5 
it is much more likely that a “reasonable” royalty will be achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION   
Although the goal of patent law in the area of damages is to 
produce no less than a reasonable royalty, the amount of discretion 
permitted to determine a reasonable royalty during litigation allows 
for completely unreasonable arguments during litigation.  More 
structure is needed, especially where the patented invention is a 
component of a product containing numerous patented inventions, 
and the patentee has not practiced or licensed the patent.  Current 
law actually encourages unreasonable arguments for damages in 
these cases, and a jury can be given a range of $5 million to $1 billion 
to award damages.1
This research paper seeks to narrow this range of unpredictability 
by determining the reasons for its existence and then proposing a 
solution.  Part I provides some background on remedies available to 
patentees in an infringement suit and explains how current law 
applies to a patentee who has not practiced or licensed the patent.  
This Part also begins the discussion of how confusing it is to 
determine a reasonable royalty, especially when the patented 
invention is only one of many patented components on a product.  
Part II continues this discussion by examining the 2009 case of 
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
  Permitting such a large range makes outcomes 
highly unpredictable and also makes it highly unlikely that a 
reasonable royalty will be determined. 
2
 1. See Verdict Summary Report, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 3166856, at *2 (listing the 
range of damages given to the jury was $5,000,000 – 999,999,999).    
 and how current law 
encouraged the parties in that case to make unreasonable arguments 
for the reasonable royalty damages.  This Part looks at the expert 
testimony in that case because this is the only way to fully understand 
how reasonable royalties are being calculated during litigations.  Part 
III illustrates how current proposals to improve the process of 
determining reasonable royalties fall short of addressing the main 
issue causing the unpredictability in determining reasonable 
 2. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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4 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
royalties.  Part IV addresses the problems raised in Parts I and II as 
well as the problems that remain after analyzing the proposals 
discussed in Part III by using a structured approach to determine 
reasonable royalty damages.  The main feature of this structured 
approach is that the jury is required to use the royalty rate offered by 
one of the parties as the primary basis in determining the reasonable 
royalty.  This requirement gives the parties incentives to make 
reasonable arguments at trial, which should result in more 
settlements and more reasonable royalties.  The proposal made here 
also gives non-practicing patentees incentives to make a good faith 
attempt to secure licensing in order to avoid reduced damages. 
I. PATENT REMEDIES LAW APPLIED TO A NON-PRACTICING PATENTEE 
There are two types of remedies for patent infringement: (1) 
injunctions; and (2) damages.3  Under current law, a patentee who 
has not practiced or licensed the invention is generally unable to 
obtain an injunction4 or damages from lost profits,5 which leaves only 
damages through determination of a reasonable royalty.  
Determining reasonable royalty damages can be a highly 
unpredictable process as shown by how far apart patentees and 
defendants have argued for damages during litigation.6  This 
unpredictability encourages litigation and prevents settlements.  To 
address this problem, this paper proposes a solution to reduce this 
range of unpredictability by encouraging parties to make reasonable 
arguments for damages and also encouraging patentees to license or 
practice their patents.  Because part of the solution encourages non-
practicing patentees to practice their patents,7
 3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2006).    
 the following 
 4. See Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 193, 194 (2008) (discussing the strong correlation between a patentee’s 
failing to practice a patent and denial of an injunction after the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected use of bright line rules to find injunctions in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).   
 5. A non-practicing patentee cannot obtain lost profits because the non-
practicing patentee cannot meet the market demand.  See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin 
Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (requiring that a 
patentee have marketing capacity to exploit demand for an invention).   
 6. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320-21 (Fed. 
Cir.  2011) (showing how the expert witness for Uniloc USA was arguing for 
reasonable royalty damages of $565 million while the expert witness for Microsoft was 
arguing for damages of only $7 million); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 
F.3d 1301, 1323  (Fed. Cir. 2009) (showing how the expert witness for Lucent argued 
for a reasonable royalty of $562 million while Microsoft argued for a reasonable 
royalty of only $6.5 million); Verdict Summary Report, supra note 1, at *2 (listing the 
range of damages given to the jury was $5,000,000 – 999,999,999).     
 7. It is recognized that it is unrealistic for most non-practicing patentees to start 
34033_am




      10/28/2013   10:59:23
34033_amp 5-1  Sheet No. 6 Side A      10/28/2013   10:59:23
C M
Y K
MCMANUS__MACROFINAL10-21 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013 2:37 PM
2013] INCENTIVES MUST CHANGE 5 
discussion on all the different remedies available to patentees 
(including injunctions, lost profits, and reasonable royalties) is 
relevant.   
A. Injunctions   
Under current law, a non-practicing patentee will likely have 
difficulty obtaining an injunction in an infringement suit.8  
Injunctions are a strong expression of a patentee’s right to exclude 
others from use of the patent.  Courts may grant a patentee injunctive 
relief in accordance with principles of equity.9  Historically, once a 
court found a patent valid and infringed, an injunction was almost 
automatic.10  In 2006 the Supreme Court rejected use of an automatic 
injunction rule and held that under well-established principles of 
equity, courts should use the traditional four-factor test to determine 
whether to grant an injunction.11  These factors include: (1) whether 
the patentee has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) whether other 
remedies are inadequate to compensate for the infringement; (3) 
whether the balance of hardships in granting the injunction favors 
the patentee; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved 
by an injunction.12
The non-practicing patentee will likely have trouble prevailing 
under the traditional four-factor test.  This is mainly because damages 
should be adequate to compensate the non-practicing patentee 
under factor two, and the balance of hardships appears to favor the 
infringer who may have to stop production of the infringing product 
under factor three.
   
13  Unsurprisingly, a denial of injunctions after 
eBay has been strongly correlated with a patentee’s failure to practice 
the patent.14
practicing their invention, but there may still be limited instances where this could 
occur.    
 Consequently, under current law a non-practicing 
 8. See Petersen, supra note 4, at 194 (discussing the strong correlation between 
a patentee’s failing to practice a patent and denial of an injunction after the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected use of bright line rules to find injunctions in eBay, Inc., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006)).   
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 10. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, J., concurring) (explaining that “[f]rom 
at least the early 19th century courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding  in 
the vast majority of patent cases”).     
 11. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.     
 12. Id.   
 13. Factors one and four also seem to favor the infringer because the non-
practicing patentee will not typically experience an irreparable injury and the public 
may be disserved if the injunction completely removes the patented invention from 
the marketplace.    
 14. Petersen, supra note 4, at 194.   
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6 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
patentee will typically only be able to seek damages. 
B. Damages   
Although courts may award damages for patent infringement 
under different theories, a non-practicing patentee may only seek 
damages for a reasonable royalty.  In a suit for patent infringement, a 
prevailing plaintiff is awarded damages “adequate to compensate for 
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for 
the use made of the invention by the infringer.”15  Damages can be an 
awarded for: (1) lost profits; (2) an established royalty; or (3) a 
reasonable royalty.16  Furthermore, the method of assessing and 
computing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 is within the discretion of 
the court.17
1. Damages for Lost Profits: Available Only to a Practicing Patentee  
  Thus, different methods to determine damages are 
available, and the courts are not necessarily limited by the methods 
previously used.  This wide discretion is a major factor contributing to 
the unpredictability of determining patent damages.   
If a patentee meets the requirements for a lost profits analysis, then 
lost profits are used to determine damages if they exceed a 
reasonable royalty.18  However, lost profits only apply if the patentee 
can meet a four-part test: including that the patentee can 
manufacture and market the invention to meet consumer demand.19
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).   
  
Since a non-practicing patentee is not a manufacturer and cannot 
meet the consumer demand, a lost profits analysis does not apply.  
The benefit of a lost profits determination is that the damages are 
more predictable than a reasonable royalty because the patentee can 
point to specific products where profits were lost.  The downside is 
that lost profits are difficult to prove and some practicing patentees 
 16. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting 
that a patentee is entitled to a reasonable royalty if lost profits cannot be proved and 
that an established royalty can be used to prove a reasonable royalty).     
 17.  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)). 
 18. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th 
Cir. 
1978)  (“When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner 
is entitled 
to a reasonable  royalty.”).     
 19. See Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545 (citing Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156) 
(noting the four-factor Panduit test used to determine if a patentee is entitled to lost 
profits damages). 
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prefer seeking a reasonable royalty.20
2. Damages for Established Royalties: Unavailable to a Non-Licensing 
Patentee  
  As discussed below, a 
reasonable royalty analysis looks at royalties for comparable patents, 
and what is comparable is subject to considerable discretion.  
Traditionally, a patentee may recover under an established royalty 
when the patentee has consistently licensed others to engage in 
conduct comparable to that of the defendant at a uniform royalty.21  
However, when a non-practicing patentee has not licensed to anyone, 
there is no established royalty that can be used.  Established royalties 
are more predictable than reasonable royalties because the patentee 
can point to specific licenses that license the patent in question.  
However, established royalties do not necessarily make the 
determination of the damages easy to predict because there can be 
numerous differences between the infringing product and the 
licensed products.  Also, an established royalty may only serve as the 
starting point for determining the reasonable royalty under the 
hypothetical negotiation method discussed in the next section.22
3. Damages for Reasonable Royalties: Available to All Patentees  
 
There are two accepted approaches used to determine a 
reasonable royalty: (1) the analytical method; and (2) the 
hypothetical negotiation.23  The analytical method focuses on the 
infringer’s projections of profit for the infringing product.24
 20. See Aron Levko, Chris Barry, Vincent Torres & Robert Marvin, PATENT 
LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 11 
(2009) [hereinafter Levko et al.], available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf (noting that practicing 
patentees often do not want to disclose proprietary cost and profit information that 
would be required to be disclosed if they argued for lost profits).   
  
Therefore, the analytical method would only apply if the infringer 
had documents showing projections related to the patented 
components and the documents could be obtained publicly or 
 21. Practicing Law Institute, Contemporary Issues in Patent Royalty Damages, 
PATENT LAW CENTER BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010, 7:00 PM) 
http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/10/13/contemporary-issues-in-patent-royalty-
damages/.    
 22. See Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 165 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that a court first looks to see if there is an established royalty rate when 
determining a reasonable royalty rate).   
 23. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(stating that there are several methods to determine a reasonable royalty, but then 
only mentioning the analytical method and the hypothetical negotiation). 
 24. Id. 
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8 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
through discovery.  The analytical method is rarely used likely 
because such projections are usually not available. 
Consequently, a non-practicing patentee who has not licensed the 
patent is usually left to argue for damages under the hypothetical 
negotiation approach, which is highly unpredictable, as mentioned 
above.25  The hypothetical negotiation is the more common 
approach to finding a reasonable royalty.26  “The hypothetical 
negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach, 
attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have 
agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began.”27  To determine the reasonable royalty that 
would have been agreed upon at the hypothetical negotiation, the 
jury or court often looks to fifteen factors initially laid out in the 
Georgia Pacific case from 1970.28  However, using these fifteen factors 
does not lead to determining patent damages with any amount of 
certainty.29
 25. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing three reasonable royalty cases where 
the plaintiff and defendant were arguing for patent damages differing by greater 
than $500 million). 
  Juries are given little guidance on how to use the 
 26. Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1324.   
 27. Id. (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).   
 28. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.  The Georgia Pacific analysis 
includes fifteen factors that are to be considered by a fact finder when determining 
the amount of a reasonable royalty.  Id.  These factors include: (1) royalties received 
by the patentee for prior licensing of the patent in suit; (2) rates paid by the licensee 
for the use of  other patents similar to the patent in suit; (3) the nature and scope of 
the license; is it exclusive or non-exclusive or restricted in scope; (4) the licensor’s 
established policy of maintaining its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use 
the patent; (5) the commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such 
as, whether they are competitors or inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of the 
patented element in promoting the sales of other products of the licensee and the 
value of the invention to the licensor; (7) the duration of the patent term and the 
term of the license; (8) the established profitability of the product made under the 
patent; (9) the utility and advantages of the patented product over old modes or 
devices; (10) the nature of the patented invention and the benefits to those who have 
used it; (11) the extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; (12) 
the portion of the profit or selling price that is customary in the business; (13) the 
portion of the realizable profit that can be attributed to the patented elements as 
distinguished from the non-patented elements; (14) the opinion testimony of 
qualified experts; and (15) the amount that the licensor and a licensee would have 
agreed upon at the time the infringement began if both had reasonably and 
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement.  Id.   
 29. See Defendant Hewlett-Packard Company’s Proposed Final Jury Instructions, 
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-
CV-1974, 2008 WL 2166594, at *2 (noting the proposed jury instructions from the 
defendant merely list the factors and say that no one factor is dispositive); see also 
Merrit J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages 
Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 
196 (2011) (“There is a general consensus that current law provides juries with 
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factors.30  The recent over ten-fold disparity between damages 
awarded by judges and by juries amplifies the unpredictability of 
reasonable royalty damages.31
Overall, the Georgia Pacific factors seem like a black box to the 
reader of a court opinion because the reader can often only see the 
output from the black box, which is the reasonable royalty damages 
amount.  For example in Cornell, the input to the black box is 
hidden because, without reading the expert testimony, the reader 
cannot even tell what royalty rates were presented to the jury in the 
first place.
   
32
C. Apportionment and the Entire Market Value Rule: Damages on 
Products Containing Patented Components  
  The inner-workings of the black box—or how the jury 
applies the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors—also remain a mystery if 
one only reads the opinion.  To provide some level of clarity, Part III 
of this paper illustrates how an expert witness in Cornell suggested 
the Georgia Pacific factors should be applied when the patentee does 
not practice the patent and there is no established royalty. 
Whether apportionment or the entire market value rule (EMVR) 
applies adds another layer of complexity to determining patent 
damages because courts have not been clear on when or how to apply 
these rules.33  If an infringing product contains many patented and 
unpatented components, then assessing damages on only one 
patented component can be a very complex task.  The general rule is 
that the patentee must give evidence to apportion the defendant’s 
profits and the patentee’s damages between the single patented 
component and the other features of the product.34  The EMVR is an 
exception to this apportionment requirement.35
insufficient information for determining a reasonable royalty.”).        
  “The EMVR allows a 
 30. See Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 196 (noting that “[o]ften juries are given 
little guidance in calculating a reasonable royalty amount and are forced to use a 
confusing list of fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors with the expectation that they will 
calculate a fair damages award”).       
 31. See Levko et al., supra note 20, at 10 (noting how jury awards for patent 
damages since 2000 have been more than ten times greater than bench awards).   
 32. See generally Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279. 
 33. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320-21 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (explaining how the lower court initially allowed the plaintiff’s expert 
witness to argue that damages for a patent, which did not drive any demand for 
Microsoft Windows or Microsoft Office, should be based on the $19 billion entire 
market value of revenue from Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office, followed by 
the same court instructing the jury not to consider the $19 billion when making their 
determination).     
 34. Id. at 1318.   
 35. Id.   
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10 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
patentee to assess damages based on the entire market value of the 
accused product only where the patented feature creates the basis for 
customer demand or substantially creates the value of the component 
parts.”36  Thus, if the patentee can show that either all or a substantial 
amount of the demand for a product is due to the single patented 
component, then the patentee may set the royalty base equal to the 
entire market value of the product.37  The patentee can then apply 
the royalty rate to this—often much larger—royalty base to collect a 
much larger reasonable royalty.38
It is unclear how the apportionment and the EMVR specifically fit 
in to the Georgia Pacific factors.
   
39
D. How Courts Have Applied the Entire Market Value Rule 
  Analyzing the Cornell case in Part 
II below shows that a non-practicing patentee could argue for 
application of the EMVR as part of the determination of reasonable 
royalty damages.  This analysis helps to understand how the EMVR 
can be used in conjunction with the Georgia Pacific factors and how 
this affects the amount of damages.  Before moving to Part II, the 
following section discusses a few EMVR cases to give a clearer picture 
of when the EMVR should be applied.   
There are a number of cases, mostly from the Federal Circuit, that 
address infringing products containing patented components and 
the use of the EMVR.  The cases fit into three categories: (1) the 
patented component is clearly not the cause for any market demand; 
(2) the patented component clearly is the cause for market demand; 
and (3) the patented component likely is the cause for some, but not 
all of the market demand.   
Category one cases, where the patented component is clearly not 
the cause for market demand, typically pertain to products that 
contain a multitude of components in areas such as software and 
electronics.  In Lucent Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit denied 
the use of the EMVR because the patented invention formed such a 
small portion of the overall product.40
 36. Id.     
 The patented invention in 
 37. It remains to be seen what level of demand will trigger “substantial demand” 
and enable application of the EMVR.   
 38. See infra Part II.B, C.   
 39. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1699 n.204 (2010) 
(claiming that although the Georgia Pacific factors do not expressly include the 
EMVR, factors eight, ten, eleven, and thirteen require some of the same 
considerations as the EMVR).     
 40. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).    
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Lucent was the date-picker function used in software, such as 
Microsoft Outlook, where a user can enter information by clicking an 
object on the screen instead of typing the information on the 
keyboard.41 The Federal Circuit held that there was insufficient 
evidence that this single date-picking feature drove any consumer 
demand.42 Similarly, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the 
Federal Circuit again denied use of the EMVR.43  In Uniloc, the 
patented invention was a software registration system where users 
must register a product key to activate the software.44  The Federal 
Circuit denied the use of the EMVR because allowing consumers to 
register their software to prevent piracy obviously did not drive any 
consumer demand.45
Category two cases, where the patented component clearly is the 
cause for market demand, typically pertain to products where the 
patented component is the one new improvement over long-
established prior art.  In Leesona Corp. v. United States,
 
46 the Court 
of Claims awarded damages based on the entire value of a portable, 
rechargeable battery system.47  The patented component was clearly 
the cause for market demand because the seller of the infringing 
batteries could only meet the government specifications for the 
battery by using the plaintiff’s patented invention.48
Category three cases, where the patented component likely is the 
cause for some, but not all, of the market demand is where 
application of the EMVR becomes more complex.  Such components 
are often found in products sold in the computer and electronics 
industries.  In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,
  These types of 
cases are rare in today’s world because products typically contain 
numerous patented inventions and the market demand could often 
be due to other factors such as marketing or the reputation of the 
seller.   
49
 41. Id. at 1308.     
 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
application of the EMVR because the patented elliptical port tube 
was integral to the overall performance of the speakers and 
contributed substantially to the market demand for the products 
 42. Id. at 1337-38.   
 43. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 44. Id. at 1296.     
 45. Id. at 1320.  Despite the court’s ruling, it does seem that Uniloc’s invention 
did drive substantial demand because many users likely only bought the software 
because they could not simply install an illegal copy.       
 46. 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
 47. Id. at 974-75. 
 48. Id. at 975.   
 49. 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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12 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
incorporating the port tube.50  Importantly, the court noted that the 
defendant’s marketing executive acknowledged that improved bass 
performance was a requirement to manufacture the infringing 
device.51  In Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, discussed in detail 
below, Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit—sitting by designation in 
the district court—rejected application of the EMVR to the servers 
and workstations that HP sold.52 This rejection occurred despite 
evidence that the patented component contributed to the overall 
performance.53
II. CALCULATION OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES IN THE CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY V. HEWLETT-PACKARD CASE 
  Thus, a contribution to the overall performance of a 
product seems to be a requirement to apply the EMVR to that 
product, but it remains unclear what degree of that contribution will 
be deemed sufficiently “substantial” to apply the EMVR.  Because of 
the complexity of determining reasonable royalty damages and 
because the patented invention in Cornell is typical of many of 
today’s products, this case is investigated further to see specifically 
how the reasonable royalty damages were determined in that case. 
The actual calculation of a reasonable royalty requires 
determination of two separate quantities: (1) a royalty base, which is 
the revenue pool implicated by the infringement; and (2) a royalty 
rate, which is the percentage of that revenue pool adequate to 
compensate the plaintiff for that infringement.54  As discussed below, 
the Georgia Pacific factors are often used to determine the royalty 
rate and royalty base.  The royalty base and royalty rate are then 
multiplied together to find the reasonable royalty.55  However, the 
reasonable royalty calculations offered by Hewlett-Packard’s expert 
witness in Cornell show that the formula in the preceding sentence 
could be altered.56
 50. Id. at 1361. 
  Although a precise method for determining a 
reasonable royalty eludes us, the background, expert witness 
testimony, and the eventual resulting damages from Cornell provide 
 51. Id. 
 52. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 53. Id. at 283. 
 54. Id. at 286.   
 55. See District Court Ruling to partially exclude expert testimony of Plaintiff 
Cornell Univ., Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189, at *1 (noting that once the royalty rate and 
the royalty base have been set, then the calculation of a reasonable royalty is 
“straightforward multiplication exercise”).    
 56. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.   
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an example of the wide discretion permitted in calculating a 
reasonable royalty under current law.   
A. Background of the Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard case 
Cornell University’s invention, the ‘115 patent, allows processors to 
complete multiple, non-dependent instructions per clock cycle.57  
Physically, the ‘115 patent claims an invention that is a component of 
an instruction reorder buffer (IRB).58  The IRB is a component of a 
processor, and the processor a component of a CPU brick.59  The 
CPU brick is a component of the infringing servers and workstations 
that Hewlett-Packard (HP) sold.60 Although the majority of the 
infringement was from the server and workstation sales, HP also sold 
a much smaller number of stand-alone processors that also 
infringed.61
B. Hewlett-Packard’s Method of Calculating a Reasonable Royalty  
   
To calculate the reasonable royalty, HP’s expert witness used three 
factors: a royalty rate; a royalty base; and a cost percentage.62  There is 
no evidence that this different method of calculating a reasonable 
royalty (i.e., using a cost percentage) was rejected by the court.  HP 
used a standard eight percent royalty rate for all of its calculations.63  
HP did the calculations using a roughly $5.7 billion royalty base64 for 
the processors and a roughly $23 billion royalty base for the CPU 
bricks.65  The cost percentage factor was set by dividing the cost of the 
infringing circuitry die area over the total cost of a processor.66
 57. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283.  The full patent number for the Cornell 
invention is U.S. Patent Number 4,807,115.      
  For 
one processor model in the $5.7 billion processor royalty base, HP’s 
expert witness determined the following: (a) the total die cost was 
$353; (b) the accused circuitry was 3.2% of the total die area; (c) the 
 58. Id.   
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co. at 12, Cornell 
Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 
2001 WL 36251280.   
 63. Id.  It is unclear why HP used the eight percent for all of its calculations, but 
is likely that HP was using eight percent because HP’s reasonable royalty calculation 
depended more heavily on how much physical area that the invention took up on 
the chip. 
 64. Id. at 10. Although HP argued for a $5.7 billion processor royalty base, the 
court determined that is should be $6.7 billion. 
 65. Id.   
 66. Id. at 16. 
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14 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
total processor cost was $600; and (d) the cost percentage of the 
infringing circuitry was found to be 1.89%.67  Due to varying cost 
percentages on different models of processors, HP’s expert witness 
calculated an overall reasonable royalty of $5.3 – 7.15 million.68  
When HP’s expert witness ran the calculations for the $23 billion 
CPU brick royalty base, the reasonable royalty was calculated to be 
$7.67 million.69 Thus, HP basically claimed that although the $23 
billion royalty base is three to four times larger, the cost percentage is 
three to four times smaller because the invention is a smaller portion 
of the larger CPU brick royalty base. It is noteworthy that the Georgia 
Pacific factors are not even mentioned in these calculations 
performed by HP’s expert witness.70
C. Cornell University’s Method of Calculating a Reasonable Royalty  
   
Cornell’s expert witness used the customary path to calculate the 
reasonable royalty by multiplying the royalty rate by the royalty base.71  
A royalty database was used to take an average of around twenty-three 
comparable royalty rates in the semiconductor chip and integrated 
circuit industries.72 The median royalty rate of the comparable 
royalties was three percent, so this was used as the starting point for 
the hypothetical negotiation.73
This three percent starting point was then adjusted by the Georgia 
Pacific factors.
   
74  Factor one did not apply75
 67. Id.  1.89% was calculated from the following.  Die cost of the accused 
circuitry is $353 * 3.2% = $11.30.  Cost percentage of the infringing circuitry relative 
to the total processor cost is $11.30/$600 = 1.89%.    
 because although Cornell 
 68. Id.  There was a range because HP was also going to argue that the there was 
an implied license from IBM on some of the processors.  If the 1.89% was used for 
the whole $5.7 billion royalty base, then the reasonable royalty would have been $8.6 
million ($5.7 billion * 8% * 1.89% = $8.6 million).      
 69. Id. at 21. 
 70. Id.  Since the jurors are instructed to use the Georgia Pacific factors, this may 
be one reason why the jury awarded the plaintiff damages of $184 million instead of 
the roughly $5-7 million HP was seeking.  See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (noting 
that the jury returned damages of $184 million).    
 71. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., Cornell Univ. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 
7928076. 
 72. See id. at 46-51 (noting that a database known as RoyaltySource was used to 
compile thirty-six different patent licenses and then the thirty-six was reduced to 
twenty-three because the defendant objected to thirteen of the royalty rates that 
resulted from litigation or that were not from arm’s length negotiations).   
 73. Id. at 48-49, 52-53. This section discusses crucial pieces of information that 
were only available in the expert testimony and not in any of the leading court 
opinions on reasonable royalty damages, which is why the expert testimony was 
critical to understanding how reasonable royalties are actually being determined.       
 74. See supra note 28 for a list of all fifteen of the Georgia Pacific factors.   
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had licensed the invention to Intel, Cornell may not have been 
receiving royalties.76  Factor two looked at three royalties paid by HP, 
and since the average of these three royalties was lower than three 
percent, this was counted as a negative factor.77  Factors four and five 
were viewed as negative factors because Cornell was not practicing its 
invention and did not want to keep the patent for a competitive 
edge.78  Factor seven was viewed as a “modest” negative factor because 
the patent term was about halfway over.79  Factor eight was viewed as 
a strong positive factor because of the profitability of the HP products 
containing the invention.80  Factors nine, ten, and eleven were all 
viewed as strongly positive factors because those factors all related to 
the advantages of the invention, and this invention had the 
demonstrated advantage of making the processors faster.81  Factor 
thirteen was viewed as an important negative factor because Cornell 
admitted that there was no doubt that HP’s brand name, reputation, 
and other technical features in the product contributed to the 
success of the infringing products.82  A few other factors were not 
mentioned.  Cornell’s expert witness looked at the four positive 
factors and the five negative factors and concluded that this creates a 
“negative tilt,” which should result in the three percent royalty rate 
being lowered to 2.5%.83
Cornell’s expert originally wanted to argue that the appropriate 
royalty base should be the revenue from the servers and workstations 
for two reasons.
  The process described here is possibly 
similar to how a jury uses the Georgia Pacific factors.  Negative factors 
cancel out positive factors for the most part, and any remaining 
factors adjust the starting point by some kind of guess, which was 
0.5% here.  
84  First, the twenty-three licensing agreements and 
the three HP licensing agreements were structured on sales of entire 
systems like a server or workstation.85
 75. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 
  Second, the server and 
71, at 53. 
 76. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 270, 291 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009) (noting that Cornell had expressly granted Intel a license, but not mentioning 
whether there was a royalty associated with the licensing agreement).     
 77. See Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 53 
(noting that there were only three available licenses because the rest of HP’s licenses 
were cross licenses where no money was changing hands).   
 78. Id. at 55-56. 
 79. Id. at 56. 
 80. Id. at 57. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 58. 
 83. Id. at 59.  
 84. Id. at 60. 
 85. Id. 
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16 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
workstations sales were the only sales that represented a true 
market.86  However, after a Daubert hearing, Judge Rader precluded 
Cornell from arguing that the royalty base should be the servers and 
workstations because Cornell could not draw any connection between 
the market for the servers and workstations and the patented 
invention.87
Cornell’s expert witness ended up arguing that the $23 billion of 
estimated revenue from the CPU bricks could be used as an 
alternative royalty base, but that this should be the minimum royalty 
base used.
   
88  Applying the $23 billion royalty base to the 2.5% royalty 
rate yielded a minimum reasonable royalty of $575 million.89
D. The Holding in Cornell  
   
The jury awarded Cornell $184 million in damages after applying a 
royalty rate of 0.8% to the CPU brick royalty base of $23 billion.90  It 
is unclear how the jury determined the royalty rate to be 0.8%.91  HP 
moved for judgment as a matter of law that the $23 billion royalty 
base was wrong.92  In response, Judge Rader concluded the damages 
were grossly excessive due to the jury’s use of the $23 billion royalty 
base.93  He determined that the $6.7 billion processor royalty base was 
proper, but did not adjust the royalty rate.94
Although Judge Rader did make it clear that the evidence did not 
support use of the EMVR to the $23 billion royalty base of the CPU 
bricks,
  The potential for juries 
to use a grossly excessive royalty base adds to the unpredictability of 
reasonable royalty damages.  This contributes to litigation and 
appeals while preventing settlements.   
95
 86. Id. 
 the holding in effect incorrectly applies the EMVR to the 
 87. See District Court Ruling to partially exclude expert testimony of Plaintiff 
Cornell Univ., supra note 55 at *3 (concluding that Cornell only showed that 
consumers opted for better performance and that the invention here was one of 
several components that added to performance, and that this was insufficient to 
justify using the server and workstation revenue as the royalty base). 
 88. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 65. 
 89. Id.   
 90. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 270, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 91. See supra note 70. The Georgia Pacific factors were in the jury instructions.  
The jury probably started with a comparable royalty rate, listed the positive and 
negative factors, and then made some kind of guess to adjust the starting point 
royalty rate based on the excess of positive factors over negative factors or vise versa.      
 92. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 93. Id. at 292. 
 94. Id.  Judge Rader held that the substantial evidence did support the royalty 
rate of 0.8%.  Id. at 293.    
 95. Id. at 292. (citing Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 
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$6.7 billion processor royalty base.  Judge Rader rejected application 
of the EMVR to the $23 billion CPU brick royalty base because (1) 
the patented invention was only one of several components that 
contributed to performance of the CPU brick and (2) because 
Cornell did not offer any demand curves to show the relationship 
between the patented invention and demand for HP’s products 
containing the patented invention.96
However, there were also no demand curves for the processors.  
This makes it unclear why apportionment of the $6.7 billion royalty 
base was not required.  It is likely because HP’s brief for judgment as 
a matter of law after the trial only argued for lowering the royalty 
base to the $6.7 billion processor royalty base.
 
97
E. The Takeaway from Cornell 
  After lowering the 
royalty base to $6.7 billion, Judge Rader likely determined the 
damages were no longer grossly excessive.  However, this does not 
seem sufficient to completely bypass what is supposed to be an 
apportionment requirement.  In the end, the resulting damages seem 
as arbitrary as throwing a dart somewhere between a high and low 
number, and the damages would likely come out significantly 
different if the same case were tried again. 
The main takeaway from Cornell is that the plaintiffs should 
continue to aim as high as possible and the defendants should 
continue to aim as low as possible, regardless if there is a lack of logic 
to their arguments.  For example, despite stopping the trial to 
conduct a Daubert hearing, in which the court excluded the $36 
billion server and workstation royalty base because it was not 
supported by any substantial evidence, the court then decided to 
allow other theories to calculate damages that had just as 
questionable evidentiary support.98  The jury showed this “aim as high 
as possible” approach was at least temporarily successful when the 
jury used this $23 billion royalty base for its calculations.99
(N.D.N.Y. 2009) No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2222189). 
  If Cornell 
did not have enough evidence to argue that the proper royalty base 
was the servers and workstations, then how did Cornell have enough 
evidence to argue that the CPU bricks should be the proper royalty 
 96. Id. at 284.   
 97. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co. in Support of Judgment 
as a Matter Of Law that Proper Royalty Base was the Processor Sales, Cornell Univ. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)  No. 501-CV-1974, 2008 
WL 4345825 at *8-9. 
 98. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284. 
 99. Id. at 282. 
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base when there was no evidence specific to the CPU bricks?100
As for HP aiming as low as possible with its questionable royalty 
calculation, there did not appear to be any evidence that any 
patentees were licensing their inventions for royalty rates that 
depended on what percentage of the semiconductor chip their 
invention physically covered.
   
101  One could conclude from common 
sense that the value of an invention should not depend on the 
physical size or manufacturing cost.  Many valuable inventions are 
quite inexpensive to produce once the process to manufacture them 
is known.102  HP’s cost percentage theory allowed HP to argue the 
damages should be as low as $5.3 million on the $5.7 billion 
processor royalty base,103 which gives an effective royalty rate of 
0.093%.104  This scheme was HP’s successful attempt at aiming as low 
as possible.  It is clear that it was successful because HP only 
challenged the royalty base and not the royalty rate used by the jury 
when HP filed its post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law 
on the damages.105
The second takeaway from Cornell is that the jury’s method of 
using the Georgia Pacific factors likely only amounts to picking some 
royalty rate in between the rates proposed by the parties.  How did 
the jury arrive at the 0.8% royalty rate?  Cornell’s expert conceded 
that the royalty rate should be adjusted down to 2.5% from its three 
percent starting point due to more negative factors than positive 
factors,
  
106 so this likely set the upper limit for the jury.  As noted in 
the paragraph directly above, HP’s expert witness presented that the 
damages should be as low as $5.3 million, which gave an effective 
royalty rate of 0.093%.107
 100. The CPU bricks were not sold, so there was no market for them to connect 
any demand.  Id. at 287.   
  In the end, the jury likely did the best they 
 101. Cornell’s expert witness noted that these types of cost-based deals are only 
used for development agreements—where a seller outsources its manufacturing—
and not where an independent patentee is negotiating with a licensee.  Expert 
Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 34.      
 102. For an extreme example, consider an invention that is reduced to software 
code.  Development costs for software may be high, but the cost of copying or 
“manufacturing” the code is very low.    
 103. Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 62, 
at 18.  Although HP argued for a $5.7 billion processor royalty base, it ended up 
being $6.7 billion.  Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 104. Royalty Rate = Royalty Damages/Royalty Base. 
 105. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 97, at 7 
(showing how HP only argued that the royalty base used by the jury was wrong, but 
not that the royalty rate used by the jury was wrong). 
 106. Expert Witness Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71, at 59. 
 107. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.   
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could to split the difference of 2.5% and 0.093% and landed at 0.8%.  
If juries largely end up splitting the difference, then parties are 
justified in aiming as high and as low as possible with their 
arguments, which, as stated above, is the main takeaway from the 
case. 
The third takeaway from Cornell is that the opinion creates as 
many questions as answers for application of the EMVR.  Does Judge 
Rader’s holding mean that Cornell provided enough evidence to 
support applying the EMVR to the $6.7 billion processor royalty base, 
or does the opinion just mean that the damages were not grossly 
excessive after the royalty base was lowered from $23 billion to $6.7 
billion?  If the evidence did support the application of the EMVR, 
then what was that specific evidence?  If the evidence did not support 
application of the EMVR, then why was apportionment of the royalty 
base not required?  Judge Rader’s opinion discloses that this issue was 
never even settled.  
For example, in this case, application of entire market value 
rule might enable Cornell to obtain royalties not only on the 
claimed features of the IRB but also on sales of processors 
which includes features beyond the scope of the claimed 
invention.108
This does show that Cornell would have at least had a decent 
chance at applying the EMVR to the processor royalty base.   
 
The argument could be made that the Cornell opinion did possibly 
manage to lower the upper limit that plaintiffs will likely argue for 
cases, where the patented component is only one of many factors that 
contribute to market demand.  This is because judges will likely begin 
to require substantial support before such evidence is presented to 
the jury.  On the other hand, if defendants continue to argue for the 
lowest possible royalty with questionable theories, such as calculations 
based on the physical size of the invention, then it may still be in the 
plaintiff’s best interest to match that with arguments for the highest 
possible royalty.  This is because as the trial ends, the high and low 
are presented to the jury, who is left to wrestle with the Georgia 
Pacific factors to split the difference.  Due to the complexity of 
applying reasonable royalty rules and the illogical arguments allowed 
in the Cornell case and similar cases,109
 108. Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. at 286 (emphasis added).   
 more structure is needed in 
 109. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1318, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (explaining how the lower court initially allowed the plaintiff’s expert witness 
to argue that damages for a patent, which did not drive any demand for Microsoft 
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determining reasonable royalties.  Before moving on to discussing the 
solution this Article proposes, it is worth examining some of the 
other proposals that have been made to address the problems in 
determining reasonable royalty damages. 
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS IMPROVE THE DETERMINATION OF 
REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES, BUT FAIL TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION 
Numerous verdicts exceeding $100 million in reasonable royalty 
cases have made the proper determination of reasonable royalties a 
popular topic.110  As discussed in this Part, various reasonable royalty 
articles have been written offering different proposals to improve the 
process.  Two approaches,111 the “Gatekeeper Approach”112
Windows or Microsoft Office, should be based on the $19 billion entire market value 
of revenue from Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Office); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 
Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (showing how Lucent was able to 
present that damages for its date-picker patent should be based off the entire market 
value of Microsoft Outlook when Lucent did not present any evidence that the 
patent drove any substantial amount of demand).  
 and the 
 110. See Christopher B.  Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1661, 1663-65 (2010) 
(listing ten different verdicts for reasonable royalty damages in excess of $100 million 
between the years of 2007 through 2009). 
 111. The next two paragraphs introduce the Gatekeeper Approach and the 
Structured Georgia Pacific Approach.  Other proposals have been made, but those 
approaches likely have limited application or do not appear to clearly improve the 
process.  See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 39, at 1667 (proposing that a reasonable 
royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused infringer’s expected 
costs of adopting an acceptable non-infringing substitute).  The key issue is 
determining if an acceptable non-infringing substitute exists.  Using the cost of a 
non-infringing substitute as a method to calculate a reasonable royalty does appear 
to be much better than using the Georgia Pacific factors when the non-infringing 
substitute is a true substitute.  See, e.g., id. at 1714 (citing Riles v. Shell Exploration & 
Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (describing how the Federal Circuit 
vacated a reasonable royalty damages award for the infringement of a method to 
anchor an oil rig because the patentee’s expert witness did not consider how much it 
would have cost the infringer to use a non-infringing alternative to anchor the same 
oil rig).  This may be a proper analysis when the patent is a method of anchoring an 
oil rig and there is an alternative non-infringing method that accomplishes the same 
result (i.e., a true substitute).  It may be more difficult to apply this theory to many of 
today’s products that can contain a multitude of patented components.  See, e.g., 
Seaman, supra note 39, at 1717 (describing how this same theory could be used to 
determine a reasonable royalty for an iPhone 4 by assuming it could be substituted 
with earlier versions of the iPhone).  A comparison between products containing a 
multitude of patents, such as cell phones, does not seem to help to value one patent 
on the infringing cell phone, which is what would need to be done in a reasonable 
royalty case.  Using a license of a non-infringing substitute for the infringing patent 
would help though, but this is essentially what expert witnesses already do when 
making claims about comparable licenses.  See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying 
text (noting that Cornell’s expert witness used a royalty database to take an average 
of around twenty-three comparable royalty rates).  Despite that this essentially 
already exists, it does seem obvious that more weight should be given to a license for 
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“Structured Georgia Pacific Approach”,113
One clear area of improvement is prohibiting patentees from 
presenting evidence on royalty bases or royalty rates that have no 
evidentiary support. To accomplish this, various articles have 
advocated for stronger rules requiring or encouraging judges to act 
as gatekeepers (the “Gatekeeper Approach”) by using Daubert 
hearings in order to exclude or limit damages evidence that lacks 
support, such as questionable royalty bases.
 have identified clear areas 
for improving the determination of a reasonable royalty.  However, 
these two approaches fall short of the solution that is needed. 
114  In Cornell, Judge 
Rader acted as a gatekeeper by using a Daubert hearing to prevent 
the plaintiff from arguing that the $36 billion in revenue from the 
server sales should be the proper royalty base.115  Using a Daubert 
hearing to screen out unreasonable royalty bases can substantially 
improve the determination of a reasonable royalty by considerably 
reducing the upper limit of what the plaintiff can credibly request for 
damages.  Similar benefits would be achieved through excluding 
royalty rates that have no evidentiary support.116
On the other hand, this is not a solution to determine reasonable 
royalties because it likely only results in removing the arguments that 
clearly lack support.
  This significantly 
and appropriately narrows the range of damages that the opposing 
parties can request and thus improves the reasonable royalty 
determination.   
117
a non-infringing substitute than simply a comparable license, but the big question is 
if that license exists.  Thus, this approach seems to have limited application to cases 
such as the oil rig patent, or it does not seem to make much of an improvement in 
cases such as valuing a patent on a cell phone.                                
  If the court does limit evidence through 
 112. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 215 (stating that Congress should 
require courts to conduct thorough Daubert hearings in reasonable royalty cases and 
noting that although judges are currently permitted to exclude evidence in Daubert 
hearings, actual exclusions are rare); Bo Zeng, Lucent v. Gateway: Putting the 
Reasonable Back into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 329, 358-360 
(2011) (discussing how Daubert hearings are rarely conducted despite numerous 
cases where the parties should have challenged the admissibility of the expert 
testimony).       
 115. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009) (discussing how the court conducted a Daubert hearing to exclude the server 
royalty base). 
 116. See, e.g., Hasbrouck, supra note 29, at 214 (stating that only royalty rates for 
comparable licenses should be allowed to be presented by the parties in a reasonable 
royalty case).   
 117. See, e.g., Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (showing how the court conducted 
a Daubert hearing to exclude the server royalty base that clearly lacked support, but 
then allowed Cornell to use the CPU brick revenue estimates as the royalty base, 
34033_am




      10/28/2013   10:59:23
34033_amp 5-1  Sheet No. 14 Side B      10/28/2013   10:59:23
C M
Y K
MCMANUS__MACROFINAL10-21 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013 2:37 PM
22 AMERICAN UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BRIEF [Vol. 5:1 
Daubert hearings, the parties will likely react by making the most 
widely varying arguments still available to them.  For example, after 
the court conducted a Daubert hearing in Cornell to exclude the 
server royalty base, Cornell simply responded by using the CPU brick 
sales as the royalty base118
Another area needing improvement is the lack of direction given 
to juries on applying the Georgia Pacific factors.  Today’s juries are 
simply given a list of the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors and instructed 
to apply the factors to the evidence without any other direction.
 even though that evidentiary support was as 
weak as the support for using the server sales as the royalty base.  
Despite this shortcoming, this improvement should be utilized in any 
reform made to determine reasonable royalties.  Consequently, this 
Gatekeeper Approach is included in the proposal this Article makes 
for determining a reasonable royalty discussed below in Part IV. 
119  
One proposal recognizes this problem and recommends improving 
the determination of a reasonable royalty by requiring a structured 
approach to using the Georgia Pacific factors (the “Structured 
Georgia Pacific Approach”).120 This Structured Georgia Pacific 
Approach proposes that a reasonable royalty can be determined by 
placing Georgia Pacific factors one through thirteen121 into four 
separate categories and using each category and its factors to answer 
one of four relevant questions.122
which also lacked support).   
 It proposes that the expert witnesses 
 118. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 284.   
 119. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions at 55-56, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics 
Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3568795 
(showing that jury instruction forty-one out of eighty-four simply lists all fifteen 
Georgia Pacific factors and that instruction fort-one simply ends with “[i]t is up to 
you, based on the evidence, to decide what type of royalty is appropriate in this 
case”).  No other direction on how to use the Georgia Pacific factors is given.  Id.     
 120. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to 
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 636-643 (2010) 
(suggesting that juries are overwhelmed by simply being handed the list of Georgia 
Pacific factors and that juries clearly need some direction on how to use the factors 
since some of the factors may be “irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory”).       
 121. See id. at 643 (explaining that factors fourteen and fifteen are “not really 
factors to be weighed at all”).  Factor fourteen, the opinion testimony of qualified 
experts is simply the source of most of the evidence to be used on the other factors.  
Id.  Factor fifteen, which describes the hypothetical negotiation between a willing 
licensor and willing licensee, “represents the ultimate question all of the other 
factors are trying to establish.”  Id.      
 122. See id. at 635 (listing the four relevant questions to be considered).  The 
relevant questions are:  “(1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the 
market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next 
best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make 
that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the 
patent to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).” Id.  
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should be limited to presenting evidence that answers these four 
questions instead of being able to explain what the output of 
applying the Georgia Pacific factors should be.123  This approach 
further recommends the use of special verdict forms, so there can be 
meaningful judicial review of the jury’s findings on damages.124
The advantages of this Structured Georgia Pacific Approach 
include: (1) the transformation of the confusing list of factors into a 
series of four straightforward questions; (2) the transparency that is 
provided by using a structured approach and special verdict forms; 
and (3) the potential for meaningful judicial review that is possible 
with the new-found transparency.
   
125  The benefits of this approach 
are clear and the changes, such as clearer jury instructions and use of 
special verdict forms, do not appear difficult to implement.  Thus, 
this approach should be undertaken as a minimum to improve the 
determination of reasonable royalty damages when applying the 
Georgia Pacific factors.  The problem with this approach is that it 
only takes effect after the parties attempt to argue for damages as far 
apart as possible, and the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach may 
not be enough to produce a reasonable royalty if future parties 
remain as successful as parties have been in the past in presenting 
extremely large ranges to the jury.126
Although the Gatekeeper Approach and the Structured Georgia 
Pacific Approach would both improve the process of determining a 
reasonable royalty, both fail to address the main problem, which 
makes reasonable royalty determination so unpredictable.  This 
problem is simple.  Patents are difficult to value.
 
127  When a third 
party decision-maker, such as a jury, cannot accurately assess value, 
the decision-maker often splits the difference as a compromise.  If a 
litigating party knows that the decision-maker is simply going to split 
the difference, then that party has the incentive to argue for damages 
as far away from their opposing party as possible.128
 123. Id. at 643.  See supra note 
  This tactic allows 
81 and accompanying text for an example where 
Cornell’s expert witness explained that the output of applying the Georgia Pacific 
factors should be a royalty rate of 2.5%.   
 124. Durie & Lemley, supra note 120, at 643.   
 125. See id. at 642-44 (explaining the advantages of the proposed structured 
approach).   
 126. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing three cases 
having a range of damages given to the jury of at least $500 million). 
 127. See id. (noting three cases having a range of damages given to the jury of at 
least $500 million, which certainly implies that the patents in those cases were 
difficult to value). 
 128. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 120, at 628-29 (noting that the plaintiff has 
incentive to “shoot for the moon” when the jury has “virtual carte blanche to pick a 
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the party to skew the midpoint of the resulting split to their side as 
much as possible.  This misaligned incentive is the root cause of the 
unpredictability in patent damages and it must be addressed. 
The solution is also simple.  The incentive for parties to make the 
most widely varying damages arguments possible must be replaced 
with an incentive to make the most reasonable argument for 
damages.  This could be accomplished by requiring the jury to 
choose the more reasonable of the proposed royalty rates as the basis 
for determining the reasonable royalty.  In Part IV, this new incentive 
is used with some other proposals, including the Gatekeeper 
Approach, to illustrate how the range of damages argued by the 
parties in Cornell could have been dramatically reduced from a 
factor of 100 to a factor of 2.5.   
IV. ADDRESSING REASONABLE ROYALTY UNCERTAINTY BY REQUIRING 
MORE STRUCTURE AND CHANGING INCENTIVES 
To address the current unpredictability in determining reasonable 
royalty damages, this article proposes a new structured approach.  
This structure is needed to reduce the incentives opposing parties 
have to make the most widely varying arguments for damages 
possible, and to give non-practicing patentees incentives to make a 
good faith attempt to license their patent.  A six-step procedure is 
proposed to accomplish these goals.  Overall, the reasonable royalty 
will be calculated by multiplying a royalty base by a royalty rate.   
A. Setting the Royalty Base: Evidence Required for the Entire Market 
Value Rule 
In step one, the royalty base is determined, and it is generally 
limited to the revenue from smallest salable component containing 
the patented invention unless the patentee can show the EMVR is 
applicable to a larger component or product.  To show the EMVR is 
applicable, the patentee must present evidence from market surveys 
or make it abundantly clear that demand was due to the patented 
component.  The surveys must conclusively show that the entire 
market value of the product or component is attributed to the 
patented invention.   
In the absence of market surveys, the patentee must have strong 
evidence to make it abundantly clear that the patented component 
drove demand.  This strong evidence will likely only be met in cases 
damages number”).   
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such as Leesona,129 where the patented component was the only way 
to meet the buyer’s specifications, or in cases such as Bose,130
Furthermore, in jury cases, courts should be required to conduct 
Daubert hearings to screen out royalty bases and royalty rates that 
lack evidentiary support (i.e., the Gatekeeper Approach).
 where 
the evidence is so strong, even the defendant admits the patented 
component is integral to the performance of the overall product.   
131  
Proposals for stronger rules to require or encourage the use of 
Daubert hearings are discussed in numerous articles.132
The rules from this step would have prevented Cornell from 
arguing that the royalty base should have been the $23 billion CPU 
brick royalty base because there were no market surveys or any 
evidence that would make it abundantly clear that the demand was 
due to Cornell’s patented component.  Consequently, Cornell would 
have been left with a royalty base of the smallest salable component, 
the $6.7 billion processor royalty base.  As you can see, this 
requirement alone would have reduced the range of damages by 
more than a third of what they were without the requirement.
  As stated 
above parties should only be able to argue for application of the 
EMVR by presenting evidence from market surveys or by making it 
abundantly clear that demand was due to the patented component.  
If Daubert hearings were required using these rules, this would limit 
the occurrences of arguments for application of the EMVR when 
there is no evidence to support it.  
133  
Applying step one, the range of damages argued by the parties, which 
started at $5.7 million to $575 million,134 is now reduced to $5.7 
million to $167.5 million.135
 129. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See supra, Part 
I.D (discussing “category two” cases where the patented component is clearly the 
cause for market demand).   
  Thus, we are on our way to making 
reasonable royalty damages more predictable.  
 130. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See supra Part 
I.D (discussing “category three” cases where the patented component is likely the 
cause for some of the market demand).   
 131. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287 
(discussing how the court conducted a Daubert hearing to exclude the server royalty 
base and then implied that the CPU brick royalty base should have also been 
excluded). 
 132. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
 133. $23 billion is 3.43 times larger than 6.7 billion.  And since there is a direct 
relationship between royalty base and royalty damages under the procedure 
proposed here, the range of damages are cut by more than a third.   
 134. See supra Part II.B-C (showing the original arguments for damages offered by 
HP and Cornell). 
 135. HP’s calculation is unaffected by step one, but Cornell’s reasonable royalty 
now has an upper limit of $6.7 billion * 2.5% = $167.5 million.   
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B. Setting the Royalty Rate: Reasonableness Required 
In step two, the parties are required to present evidence on what 
they believe the royalty rate should be by providing examples of 
royalty rates for licensing of similar patents or any existing exemplar 
licenses of the same patent.  The parties cannot start by picking a 
random rate out of out of thin air as HP did by starting with a 
“standard eight percent,” and then apply that random number to a 
new theory, such as cost percentage136 to create an effective royalty 
rate of 0.093%.137
Also, parties must include in their explanation of a similar royalty 
rate, the number of patents on the product that was the royalty base 
for that similar royalty rate.
  The parties are required to make reasonable 
adjustments to their royalty rate using the Georgia Pacific factors.   
138
In step three, the jury must pick either the plaintiff’s royalty rate or 
the defendant’s royalty rate as a starting point.  The jury may not 
simply pick some middle ground.  This requirement replaces the 
incentive for the parties to argue as high and low as possible with an 
incentive to make an argument that is more reasonable than the 
opposing party.  The jury is required to consider the Georgia Pacific 
factors to determine which party’s royalty rate is more reasonable.  
This incentive for reasonableness should greatly narrow the range of 
  This normalizes the royalty rates 
because applying a three percent royalty rate on a product containing 
ten patents to a different product containing 100 patents is not really 
comparable.  The defendant will have the burden to show the 
number of patents on the product or component that was 
determined to be the royalty base in step one.  The defendant is 
given this burden because, as the manufacturer or seller of the 
infringing product or component, it should have superior knowledge 
as to the number of patents on that product or component. 
Additionally, the defendant also has the incentive to identify a larger 
number of patents on that product or component. 
 136. See supra  Part II.B (discussing HP’s cost percentage theory, which concludes 
that the value of a patent on a processor should be based on the ratio of the cost of 
the infringing circuitry die area over the cost of the whole processor).   
 137. See supra Part II.E (explaining how reasonable royalty damages of $5.3 
million on a $5.7 billion processor royalty base gives an effective royalty rate of 
0.093%).   
 138. If obtaining data on the number of patents used on similar products proves 
too costly, then it is possible that some industry averages could be applied.  For 
example, if an expert witness in a case similar to Cornell was presenting evidence on 
a royalty rate applied to a processor used on a Dell server, but the number of patents 
used in the design of the Dell server was unknown, then the expert witness could 
present evidence on the average number of patents used on server processors, which 
were similar to the processor on the Dell server.     
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reasonable royalties presented.  For example in Lucent, it is unlikely 
Lucent would have taken the risk to make arguments for its damages 
using license agreements that were not “in any way similar to the 
technology litigated.”139  Similarly, in Cornell, HP probably would not 
have felt comfortable making arguments as unreasonable as claiming 
the value of an invention should be determined by its physical size.140
Requiring the jury to pick the most reasonable royalty rate is 
similar to what is known as final-offer arbitration or “baseball 
arbitration,” due to its use in resolving salary disputes in Major 
League Baseball (MLB).
 
141  Final-offer arbitration requires the 
arbitrator to choose the offer of one of the parties involved in the 
arbitration, whereas conventional arbitration allows the arbitrator to 
choose the settlement amount.142  Although patent damages seem 
quite different from a MLB salary, both share one main problem, the 
fear that the decision-maker will simply split the difference between 
the parties’ positions.143  This problem results in the parties taking 
extreme positions and refusing to settle.144  Final-offer arbitration 
addresses this problem by giving the parties an incentive to make a 
reasonable argument because the arbitrator must only pick one of 
the offers.145  Due to the extreme ranges for damages given to juries 
in Cornell and similar cases, one can only assume that the jury is 
simply splitting the difference, and that the parties arguing patent 
damages also need this incentive to make reasonable arguments.146
The incentive to make a reasonable argument in Cornell would 
have likely forced HP to argue for a royalty rate of approximately one 
  
Step three provides this incentive, and it could have made a 
significant difference in Cornell.   
 139. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the license agreements that Lucent was using to make its reasonable 
royalty damages arguments were not comparable to Lucent’s date-picker patent). 
 140. See Expert Witness Testimony for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra 
note 62, at 14-15 (discussing HP’s cost percentage theory, which concludes that the 
value of a patent on a processor should be based on the ratio of the cost of the 
infringing circuitry die area over the cost of the whole processor).  See also supra 
Part III.B (explaining some of the details of HP’s cost percentage theory). 
 141. See Benjamin A Trulis, Final-Offer “Baseball” Arbitration: Contexts, 
Mechanics & Applications, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 86 (2010) (noting 
that the most discussed use of final-offer arbitration is its application in resolving 
MLB disputes).   
 142. Id. at 186. 
 143. See id. at 88 (noting that final-offer arbitration was developed to counteract 
the fear that the arbitrator will simply “split the difference”).    
 144. Id. at 88.   
 145. Id. at 89. 
 146. See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing three cases 
having a range of damages given to the jury of at least $500 million).   
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percent.  This is despite the fact that HP asked for an effective royalty 
rate of 0.093% based on its cost percentage factor theory.147  It is 
evident that HP considered a royalty rate of approximately one 
percent to be reasonable because HP did not even challenge the 
0.8% royalty rate returned by the jury in its post-verdict motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on the damages.148  Therefore, if HP 
started its damages argument with what HP actually considered a 
reasonable royalty rate, approximately one percent, the range of 
damages to be argued by the two parties would have been narrowed 
even further.  Assuming Cornell considered its 2.5% royalty rate 
reasonable,149 and using the $6.7 billion royalty base determined in 
step one, the range of damages would have started off at $67 million 
to $167.5 million.150
With these three steps, the range of damages has been reduced 
from approximately $570 million to approximately $100 million.  
More importantly, Cornell’s requested damages are now only 2.5 
times HP’s proposed damages as opposed to the actual argument in 
court, where Cornell’s requested damages were over 100 times 
greater than HP’s proposed damages.
 
151
This belief is important because the hypothetical negotiation is 
supposed to simulate how a willing licensor and willing licensee 
would behave if an actual negotiation occurred.  Willing licensors 
and willing licensees make reasonable arguments during actual 
  Consequently, the parties 
are now only off by a multiple, where it is believable that they would 
have actually negotiated with each other before the infringement.   
 147. See supra Part II.E (explaining how reasonable royalty damages of $5.3 
million on a $5.7 billion processor royalty base gives an effective royalty rate of 
0.093%).   
 148. See Reply Brief for Defendant Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 97, at *8-9 
(showing how HP only argued that the royalty base used by the jury was wrong, but 
not arguing that the royalty rate used by the jury was wrong).  It is also believable that 
HP considered a royalty rate around one percent or higher to be reasonable because 
when HP had Cornell remove thirteen of the thirty-six comparable licenses Cornell 
was proposing, the average of the remaining proposed comparable royalty rates, 
which started at around three percent, actually increased.  See Expert Witness 
Testimony for Plaintiff Cornell Univ., supra note 71 (noting Cornell’s exclusion of 
thirteen of its thirty-six proposed comparable royalty rates after HP’s objection to a 
number of the proposed comparable licenses).       
 149. This may be a big assumption.  The first two royalty bases attempted by 
Cornell ended up being rejected by the court, so there is no reason to assume that 
their first attempt for arguing a royalty rate was reasonable.  See supra Part III.C 
(discussing how the court ultimately rejected Cornell’s attempts to use the server 
revenue or CPU brick revenue as a royalty base).       
 150. 6.7 billion * 1% = $67 million & $6.7 billion * 2.5% = $167.5 billion.    
 151. See supra Part III.B-C (showing that HP originally offered damages of $ 5.7 
million while Cornell requested damages of $575 million). 
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licensing negotiations because they do not want to risk losing a 
potentially valuable royalty or license.  Parties who believe their 
opposing party’s price is off by a factor of 100 would never negotiate, 
meaning there would not be a willing licensor or willing licensee, and 
the purpose of the hypothetical negotiation would be lost.  On the 
other hand, where proposed prices or royalties are only off by a 
multiple of 2.5, it is much more believable that the parties would be 
willing to negotiate and agree to a price.  This comes much closer to 
achieving the purpose of the hypothetical negotiation. 
If the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach152 were used instead of 
this step, then the jury would still be faced with applying the Georgia 
Pacific factors to a range of damages, where it is not believable that 
the parties would have actually negotiated.  To take Cornell as an 
example, even if the $23 billion CPU brick royalty base was properly 
screened out, Cornell would have still been requesting damages of 
$167.5 million, which is approximately twenty-nine times greater than 
the $5.7 million that HP was offering.  It is likely that the 
requirements of the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach would have 
reduced the range of damages in Cornell noticeably below a factor of 
twenty-nine,153
In step four, the jury adjusts the chosen royalty rate starting point 
from step three by using Georgia Pacific factors three through 
fifteen.  If the jury agrees with how the chosen party used the Georgia 
Pacific factors, then no adjustment is needed.  If the jury disagrees, 
then they can raise or reduce the royalty rate by as much as twenty 
percent of the chosen royalty rate.
 but it is also unlikely that the range would have 
approached a factor of 2.5.  This is because the Structured Georgia 
Pacific Approach—despite its increased structure—still allows the jury 
to arrive at any dollar amount in between the damages presented by 
the parties.  With this option still on the table, the parties still have an 
incentive to argue as far away as possible from their opponent, 
although certainly in a more reasonable way than what currently 
occurs during litigation.   
154
 152. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text. 
 For example, if the jury in 
Cornell had chosen Cornell’s 2.5% royalty rate, then the jury would 
only be able to adjust the royalty by 0.5%.  This twenty percent 
 153. For example, the Structured Georgia Pacific Approach requires the parties to 
present evidence on the different Georgia Pacific factors, which would have likely 
screened out HP’s cost percentage theory. 
 154. While choosing twenty percent as the limit is somewhat arbitrary, this 
number should probably not be increased above thirty-three percent due to all of the 
criticism that exists for using the Georgia Pacific factors as the main method for 
determining reasonable royalty damages.   
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limitation reflects the reality that applying the Georgia Pacific factors 
to widely varying expert testimony is a confusing and imprecise 
process while recognizing that the Georgia Pacific factors are still 
relevant and should be permitted to have some effect on resulting 
damages.  
This limited uncertainty of twenty percent is much more 
acceptable than the current method of just directing the jury to look 
at all the evidence and the Georgia Pacific factors with no structure to 
determine the reasonable royalty.155  Retaining use of the Georgia 
Pacific factors as part of the reasonable royalty determination will also 
give parties the incentive to use all the relevant Georgia Pacific 
factors when making their arguments to the jury.  If a party fails to 
discuss an unfavorable factor, then the jury may penalize them for 
the omission.  Further improvement to this step could be obtained by 
incorporating some of the features from the Structured Georgia 
Pacific Approach, such as providing clearer jury instructions that 
would transform the confusing list into a series of four 
straightforward questions, and requiring the use of special verdict 
forms that would make the jury’s determination transparent and 
allow for meaningful judicial review.156
C. Calculating the Reasonable Running Royalty: No Lump Sums  
   
In step five, the jury calculates the reasonable royalty damages by 
multiplying the royalty base from step one by the royalty rate from 
step four.  Notably, the procedure proposed here is only calculating 
running royalties, and does not allow for calculating amounts that 
would have been paid for a lump-sum license.  Many of the reasons 
for using a lump-sum license are rendered unnecessary when the 
amount of infringing sales is already known.  Some reasons for using 
a lump-sum license include: (1) removing the patentee’s 
administrative burden to monitor the use of the invention; (2) 
prevent the licensee from misreporting usage of the invention; (3) 
allowing the licensor to remove the risk that the licensee does not use 
the invention; and (4) allowing the licensee to take the risk that the 
product using the invention will be wildly successful.157
 155. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions, supra note 
  These 
119, at 55-56 (showing that jury 
instruction forty-one out of eighty-four simply lists all fifteen Georgia Pacific factors 
and that instruction forty-one simply ends with “[i]t is up to you, based on the 
evidence, to decide what type of royalty is appropriate in this case”).  No other 
direction on how to use the Georgia Pacific factors is given.  Id. 
 156. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of the 
Structured Georgia Pacific Approach).   
 157. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
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reasons are all moot by the time the infringement case appears in 
court.   
It is understood that the goal of the hypothetical negotiation is to 
determine the license that the parties would have agreed to had they 
successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.  
In theory, it would be nice if courts could accurately recreate every bit 
of information necessary to accurately determine the license the 
parties would have agreed to just before the infringement began, but 
this seems to be more of a fantasy than a real possibility.158  For the 
sake of being practical and avoiding the interjection of the extra 
uncertainty that a lump-sum license brings, it is recommended to 
calculate the damages by applying the actual known sales of the 
infringing product to a running royalty.159  Limited exceptions to this 
general rule could allow for a lump-sum calculation to be used if it is 
abundantly clear that a lump-sum license would have been chosen by 
both of the parties.160
D. Adjusting the Reasonable Royalty: Incentives to License   
   
In step six, the jury lowers damages if a non-practicing patentee 
never licensed the patent and never made a good faith attempt to 
license the patent.161
 158. The large ranges for damages in numerous reasonable royalty cases shows 
that when the parties have the opportunity to make widely varying arguments for 
damages, they will do so.  See case cited supra note 
  If no good faith attempt was made, then the 
reasonable royalty damages from step five are lowered by: (1) twenty-
five percent if no such attempt is made within one year following 
6 (discussing three reasonable 
royalty cases where the plaintiff and defendant were arguing for patent damages 
differing by greater than $500 million).  A lump-sum license offers the parties 
another opportunity to make widely varying arguments while a running royalty 
calculation based on actual sales removes this extra area of uncertainty.        
 159. There also seems to be more risk that a judicially determined lump-sum 
license would be more unfair than a judicially determined running royalty.  For 
example, if the steps proposed by this Article are used, then the royalty base and 
royalty rate should be within a reasonable range, which should result in damages that 
are also within a reasonable range.  On the other hand, a lump-sum damages award 
would be based on the parties estimates of how many products using the invention 
will be sold after the infringement begins.  This estimate seems like a variable that 
would be easy to manipulate.  Using a judicially determined lump-sum license, it 
would be possible for these sales estimates to be substantially different from the sales 
that actually occurred.  Also, these “pretend” estimates were likely never made before 
the infringement began since the parties did not negotiate with each other.         
 160. For example, if both of the parties had a history of licensing almost 
exclusively with lump-sum licenses, then a lump-sum license analysis could be made.  
Under this approach, exclusive use of lump-sum licenses by only one of the parties 
would not be sufficient.     
 161. If the patentee practiced the invention, then no adjustment would be made 
here.   
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grant of the patent; (2) fifty percent if no such attempt is made 
within three years following grant of the patent; and (3) seventy-five 
percent if no such attempt is made within five years following grant of 
the patent.  Reductions of damages under this rule are stopped as 
soon as the patentee files the case claiming infringement.162  A grant 
of a patent often takes around three years.163  If the patentee uses a 
provisional application, then this time can be extended another 
year.164  This means a patentee can have roughly five years165
A good faith attempt is met if the patentee negotiated with a 
licensee capable of producing a significant amount of product
 to make 
a good faith attempt to license the patent, so a patentee is not exactly 
being rushed under this rule.   
166 
containing the patented invention, and the patentee shows 
documentation or the licensee testifies that the licensee was willing to 
license, but that the parties could not agree on the royalty.  If the 
licensee cannot come within fifty percent of the rate offered by the 
patentee, then such a negotiation cannot be used as evidence of a 
good faith negotiation.  On the other hand, if the patentee 
attempted to negotiate with the alleged infringer, then the patentee 
shows good faith if the rate offered by the infringer in the 
negotiation or the royalty rate determined in step four is within 
thirty-three percent of the rate offered by the patentee.167
Step six reduces the incentive for a non-practicing patentee to hold 
on to a patent and wait for infringement.
   
168
 162. For example, if the patentee filed for infringement 1.5 years after being 
granted the patent, but the jury does not assess damages until 3.5 years after grant of 
the patent, then the jury looks at the 1.5 years and only reduces damages by twenty-
five percent if no good faith attempt to license was made.     
  The main purpose of this 
 163. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability 
Report Fiscal Year 2011 14 (2011) available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/ 
stratplan/ar/index.jsp (noting that the average pendency of patent applications at 
the USPTO was 33.7 months in fiscal 2011).     
 164. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (2006).   
 165. It is five years because there is three years for the approximate average time it 
takes to grant a patent plus one for the provisional application, plus one for the one 
year after the grant of the patent before the adjustment under this rule takes effect.    
 166. A significant amount could be an amount necessary to serve ten percent of 
the U.S. national market for that product.   
 167. The patentee has a lower bar here to make it riskier for infringers to refuse to 
negotiate.  Setting the numbers at fifty percent and thirty-three percent are only a 
starting point and other percentages may ultimately strike a better balance.   
 168. Non-practicing patentees often wait many years to file infringement suits.  
See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 490-91 (2012) 
(noting in a study of highly litigious non-practicing entities (NPE) that the average 
time a NPE waited before filing infringement was 8.3 years, but also noting that a 
good portion of this delay appeared to be due to the inventor/initial assignee and 
not necessarily due to the NPEs studied in the analysis).  Possibly some of the NPEs 
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step is to encourage a non-practicing patentee to license their patents 
for two reasons.169  First, the government grants patents to encourage 
innovation.170  Innovation should be encouraged so that new and 
useful products are brought to the marketplace to enhance the lives 
of the public.171  Innovation should not be encouraged for the 
purpose of allowing patent trolls to hide until they see an opportunity 
to sue for highly unpredictable infringement damages.  Currently, 
our patent system has created a situation where non-practicing 
patentees, including patent trolls, have been able to obtain twice the 
amount of damages than their practicing counterparts.172
The second reason to encourage licensing is so that a royalty rate 
from a real negotiation could be used if an infringement case arises.  
Once non-practicing patentees see that it is risky to simply hold onto 
their patents without licensing, these patentees will make more of an 
effort to license their patents.  If the patentee succeeds in licensing, 
then this rate will be some of the strongest evidence of the royalty 
rate at which the infringer would have licensed the invention.  If the 
patentee fails to license the invention, but makes a good faith attempt 
to license the patent, then this is still strong evidence of the royalty at 
  Thus, our 
patent system encourages those who are not bringing products to 
market more than those who are bringing new products to the 
market.  This frustrates the goal of patent law.  Step six counteracts 
this disparity and makes it significantly more risky for the non-
practicing patentee to simply hold onto the patent and wait for 
infringement.   
made a good faith effort to license, but many probably did not, so a stronger 
incentive to license is needed.       
 169. It is unlikely that this step would encourage many patentees to start 
practicing the patent themselves.  For example, most university professors who 
obtain patents prefer to continue their research as opposed to quitting their jobs to 
start a company.  Similarly, a patent troll does not have any intention to bring 
products to market through practicing or licensing.  Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the 
Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent System, 22 FED. CIRCUIT 
B.J. 101, 105 (2012).     
 170. The U.S. Constitution encourages innovation by promoting “the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8.   
 171. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 
(1989) (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for 
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in 
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a 
period of years.”) (emphasis added). 
 172. See Levko et al., supra note 20, 5 (noting how damage awards for non-
practicing entities have been more than double the damages awarded to practicing 
entities since 1995).    
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which the infringer may have licensed the patent.  Presumably, the 
infringer would have also determined the patentee’s price was too 
high, but it is likely that the parties who failed to reach an agreement 
were negotiating somewhere in the range of a reasonable royalty, and 
not separated by a factor 100 as was the case in Cornell. 
Another benefit of step six is that regardless of when the non-
practicing/non-licensing patentee addresses the infringement, step 
six reduces the amount of damages this patentee can demand.  If this 
non-practicing/non-licensing patentee addresses the infringement 
within one year of receiving the patent, then step six does not reduce 
the royalty rate or royalty base, but the total amount of damages is 
reduced because fewer infringing products will have been sold.  On 
the other hand, if the patentee makes no attempt for five years, then 
step six drastically cuts the damages by seventy-five percent.  This 
reduces the ultimate range of damages at trial under either scenario 
and in many cases may prevent trial.  For example, after five years, 
the patentee’s proposed damages would need to be well over four 
times the defendant’s proposed damages because four (i.e., the 
patentee’s proposed damages) reduced by seventy-five percent (i.e., 
the defendant’s proposed damages) is one.  It is also noteworthy that 
if the infringement begins five years after the grant of the patent and 
the non-practicing patentee, who made no attempt to license, files 
immediately, the damages are still cut by seventy-five percent.  If the 
damages were not cut until infringement began, certain patent trolls 
would still take the risk to wait for infringement.  Again, waiting for 
infringement is not the goal of our patent system. 
Some might argue that step six encourages infringement, but the 
infringer will still be taking a significant risk by deliberately 
infringing.  First, the infringer would have no idea whether or not the 
patentee ever made a good faith attempt to license the patent.  If the 
patentee did make a good faith attempt, the damages would not be 
reduced at all.  Furthermore, the jury could still determine that the 




Ultimately, the structured approach proposed here would need to 
be legislatively enacted.  Notably, the recently enacted America 
 173. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (allowing the court to assess damages of up to 
three times the amount found).      
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Invents Act174 did not make any changes to how reasonably royalties 
are calculated.175  Legislative enactment would overrule the vast 
discretion courts currently have to hear any method to determine 
reasonable royalty damages.176  Legislative enactment would also 
obviate the need for courts to strike down illogical rules one at a 
time, such as how the twenty-five percent rule was recently struck 
down in Uniloc.177
As discussed above, if steps one through five of the proposed rules 
were applied to the Cornell case, the plaintiff could have at most 
argued for damages that were 2.5 times the damages of the 
defendant.
   
178  This is an enormous improvement over the actual 
litigation, where the plaintiff argued for damages that were 100 times 
greater than the damages argued by the defendant.179
 174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
  This reduction 
by a factor of forty was accomplished with two simple rules.  First, 
patentees can only argue for application of the EMVR if they have 
strong supporting evidence, such as surveys.  Second, the jury is 
required to pick the most reasonable royalty rate offered by the 
parties.  This step accepts the reality that patents are difficult to value 
and that an incentive to make reasonable arguments for reasonable 
royalty damages is needed to prevent the parties from making the 
most widely varying arguments possible.  Additionally, if Cornell had 
not licensed the patent, then the range of damages would have been 
reduced even further in step six.  This last step discourages non-
practicing patentees from choosing to wait for infringement instead 
of attempting to license their patents.  This final step also helps to 
align the laws for determining reasonable royalty damages with the 
overall policy of patent law, which is to encourage innovation in 
order to bring innovations to the public.  With these six steps, the 
 175. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: 
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 435, 439, 445 (2011) (noting that although earlier 
versions of the America Invents Act (AIA) contained provisions reforming 
reasonable royalty determinations, amendments to the AIA made in March of 2011 
removed the last provisions that would affect the award of damages).   
 176. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(stating broadly that the method of computing patent damages is within the 
discretion of the court).    
 177. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting use of the twenty-five percent rule because this rule of thumb fails to 
associate royalty rates used in prior licenses to the particular hypothetical negotiation 
at issue). 
 178. See supra Part IV.B (explaining how the range of damages in Cornell would 
have been $67 million to $167.5 million if steps one through three of the proposed 
steps were applied).   
 179. See supra Part II.B-C (showing the original arguments for damages offered by 
HP and Cornell). 
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highly unpredictable process of determining a reasonable royalty can 
be replaced with a new structured approach that can actually produce 
a royalty that is reasonable.  
